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BUT I DIDN'T DO IT: PROTECTING 
THE RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 
DURING INTERROGATION 
LISA M. KRZEWINSKI* 
Abstract: Juveniles' susceptibility to suggestion, coupled with their 
inherent naiveties and immature thought processes, raise considerable 
doubt as to their ability to understand and exercise their Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination. Furthermore, they are 
extremely vulnerable to overimplicating themselves in crimes or, even 
more unfortunate for all involved, confessing to crimes they did not 
even commit. To protect the rights and interests of juveniles, states must 
enact several safeguards. This Note suggests, for example, that courts 
which currently use a totality of the circumstances test to determine 
whether a juvenile confession is voluntary, and thus not a violation of 
the Fifth Amendment, should abandon it in favor of a less-flexible per 
se rule. Additionally, states need to simplify the Miranda warning into 
language more conducive to juveniles' comprehension. To increase the 
reliability of confessions and prevent false confessions altogether, 
interrogators need to cease using the same interrogation tactics, such as 
leading questions and the presentation of false evidence, on juveniles as 
they do on adults. 
INTRODUCTION 
The juvenile court system is based on the premise that a juvenile 
is different physically, mentally, and intellectually from an adult.! In 
the 1966 case In re Gault, the bedrock upon which modern juvenile 
law is based, the United States Supreme Court commented: 
[i]f counsel was not present for some permissible reason 
when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be 
taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense 
not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it 
*Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAw JOURNAL, 2001-2002 
1 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1966); Raymond Chao, Mirandizing Kids: Not as Simple 
as A-B-C, 21 WHITTIER L. REv. 521, 523 (2000); Steven Drizin, Anatomy of a Murder: The 
Ryan Harris Case, Oct. 20, 1998, at 10 (on file with author). 
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was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent 
fantasy, fright or despair.2 
This statement implicitly recognizes two separate but related 
problems inherent in the interrogation ofjuveniles.3 First is the ques-
tion of whether a juvenile has the capacity to understand his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, which is "explained" to 
him through the standard Miranda warning.4 Furthermore, assuming 
the juvenile understands this right, will he successfully invoke it when 
he is alone in a small interrogation room, facing the accusatory ques-
tions of law enforcement officers?5 
Second, even if a juvenile makes a statement "voluntarily, know-
ingly and intelligently,"6 the reliability of his statements may be ques-
tionable.7 For a variety of reasons, including an incapacity for adult 
reasoning, susceptibility to suggestion, and a value system misunder-
stood by adults, a juvenile may give a confession that can be anything 
from partly untrue to wholly false.8 This, of course, can have severe 
repercussions for the juvenile because a confession is an extremely 
powerful piece of evidence for the judge or jury to take into consid-
eration when deciding whether to convict.9 
When a juvenile is arrested, there may be conflicting public poli-
cies at work.10 Court officials must ensure the protection of a juve-
nile's constitutional rights, as well as recognize his inherent naivete 
and immaturity regarding these rights.ll At the same time, juveniles 
do sometimes commit heinous and horrible crimes.12 In such in-
2387 U.S. at 55. 
S See id. 
4 See, e.g., Chao, supra note 1, at 522; infra notes 106-119 and accompanying text. The 
Fifth Amendment provides, in part that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
5 See id. at 521. 
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
7 See Chao, supra note 1, at 522. 
8 See Malcolm C. Young, Representing a Child in Adult Criminal Court, 15 CRIM.JUST. 14, 
16 (Spring 2000); An Obligation to Protect the Children, CHI. nuB., Nov. 15, 1999, at 18; 
Robyn E. Blumner, Children Confess, Whether They Did It or Not, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 
2,1999, at 6D. 
9 SeeAmyBach, True Crime, False Confession, THE NATION, Feb. 8, 1999. For example, "A 
recent study of cases in which the only piece of evidence was a confession, flying in the 
face of contrary physical evidence, found that juries will convict 73% of the time." Id. 
10 SeeRichardA. Devine, WorkingforFairjuvenilejustice, CHI. nuB.,July 28,1999, at 16. 
11 See Chao, supra note 1, at 525. 
12 See, e.g., Devine, supra note 10. 
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stances, police and prosecutors must be allowed to hold the juvenile 
accountable for his acts in order to protect the community.I3 
This Note recognizes the tension between these goals and sug-
gests ways to strike a better balance between them. Part I of this Note 
discusses ways in which juvenile statements may not be wholly truth-
ful, as well as reasons behind the unreliability. Part II describes the 
debate about whether a juvenile can knowingly, intelligently, and vol-
untarily waive his Fifth Amendment right. Finally, using the context of 
In re B.M.B., Part III suggests various safeguards a juvenile court must 
implement to address a juvenile'S ability to waive his constitutional 
rights. The author suggests the abandonment of the totality of the 
circumstances test used by the majority of the states to determine 
whether a juvenile properly waived his rights and, instead, advocates 
the adoption of a per se rule of statement admissibility. Part III also 
explores ways to increase the reliability of a juvenile's statement. For 
example, the author suggests the need for a police interview tech-
nique more in line with the psychological development of juveniles, as 
well as a waiver form written in language comprehensible to juveniles. 
I. THE UNRELIABILITY OF JUVENILE STATEMENTS 
Everyone involved in the juvenile justice system is familiar with 
the aftermath of the Ryan Harris tragedy.I4 In 1998, two young boys, 
only seven and eight years of age, were charged with murdering an 
eleven-year-old girl, Ryan. I5 The two boys confessed to Chicago Detec-
tive James Cassidy that they hit Ryan in the head with a brick in order 
to steal her bicycle. I6 The country was horrified that such young chil-
dren could commit such a heinous crime)7Months later, however, the 
charges against the boys were dropped after DNA tests of the semen 
found on Ryan's clothing linked the crime to an adult male.I8 
This was not the first time that Detective Cassidy obtained an un-
truthful confession from young children.I9 Four years earlier, Detec-
tive Cassidy elicited a similar juvenile confession from a ten-year-old 
USee id.;Juvenile Rights, CHI. SUN-TIMEs,July 21,1999. 
14 See, e.g., Bach, supra note 9; Drizin, supra note 1, at 10. 
15 See Maurice Possley, Boy Convicted of Slaying at Age 10 Appeals, CHI. TRlB., Jan. 11, 
2000, at 1. 
16 See id. 
17 See Drizin, supra note 1, at2. 
18 See Possley, supra note 15. Apparently, Detective Cassidy still maintains tlIat tlIe 
statements of tlIe two boys were trutlIful. See id. 
19 See id. 
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Chicago boy, AM., who was eventually convicted of the murder of his 
eighty-four-year-old neighbor.20 Police charged the boy with the mur-
der almost entirely based on his confession-the juvenile's 
fingerprints were never found inside the victim's home, despite the 
fact that it appeared to be ransacked; a bloody palm print and shoe 
print did not match to the juvenile; and the 173-pound victim was 
found bound with a telephone cord around her arms, neck, and 
hand, and was dragged throughout the house.21 At the time of the 
murder, the juvenile was an eighty-eight-pound ten year old.22 
Almost a year after the murder, AM. 's mother allowed him to go 
with Cassidy and another detective to police headquarters, believing 
that they wan ted her son to look at photographs of possible suspects.23 
She was later summoned to the police station and told her son had 
confessed to the murder.24 Upon seeing his mother, the first thing the 
juvenile said was, "I told them that I did it, but I didn't do it."25 He 
indicated to her that he had confessed so that he could leave the po-
lice station in time to attend a birthday party. 26 
In January 2000, a sixteen-year-old AM. appealed his conviction, 
contending that he had been coerced into giving a false confession.27 
He testified in federal court that Detective Cassidy had yelled and 
cursed at him, screaming out at various points, "I know you did it. I 
know you killed her. "28 He testified that Cassidy had patted him on 
the knee, saying, "God forgives you and we forgive you. "29 Most dis-
turbingly, he testified that Cassidy had promised him that he would be 
released to attend his younger brother's birthday party if he would 
just say what happened.30 A.M. said that he could not handle the pres-
sure and eventually "just broke down" and confessed that he had 
committed the murder.31 
The similarities between the two stories are striking: all three of 
the children, AM. and the two young boys in the Harris case, are M-
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See Possley, supra note 15. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 See id. 
28 See Possley, supra note 15. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. 
31 See id. 
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rican-American boys whose parents were initially told by police that 
their children were witnesses, not suspects.32 Consequently, all three 
spontaneously confessed without the presence of parents or a lawyer. 33 
All three immediately recanted once allowed to talk with their par-
ents.34 
These similarities also indicate the problems inherent in police 
interrogation ofjuveniles.35 Labeling a confession "coerced" conjures 
images of police brutality and violence or endless hours of interroga-
tion without access to food or sleep.36 But, as these cases attest, coer-
cive forces that lead to inaccurate or false juvenile confessions can be 
much more subtle, and they are often the result of inappropriate po-
lice tactics playing upon the immature thought processes and naive-
ties ofjuveniles.37 
According to child witness expert Richard Leo, "[a] false confes-
sion is the natural consequence of police toughness on young 
adults. "38 Police tactics, including the use of leading questions and the 
presentation of false evidence, can be extremely persuasive to chil-
dren, who are naturally susceptible to suggestion.39 Psychologist Ste-
phen Ceci has conducted several studies that have shown that while 
the methods police use to interrogate suspects will elicit false confes-
sions from both adults and children, children are particularly suscep-
tible to manipulation and persuasion.40 And, Mark Chaffin, a child 
development specialist, recently testified that 
[e]ven in situations less stressful and coercive than a station-
house interrogation ... substantial numbers of children will 
~2 See Bach, supra note 9. 
~~ See id. 
~4 See id. In fact, the similarities between the two stories are what, eventually, enabled 
the sixteen-year-old juvenile to appeal to a federal court. See id. One of his lawyers, Steven 
Drizin, who had unsuccessfully argued to the Illinois Supreme Court the year before that 
his client's confession had been coerced, noticed an article about the Harris case in the 
Chicago Tribune. See id. The article was about the false confession obtained by Detective 
James Cassidy, the same detective who had obtained his client's confession four years ear-
lier. See id. 
35 See Drizin, supra note 1, at 4. 
36 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 446 (1966); Bach, supra note 9. 
~7 See Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability, & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 
15 CRIM.JUST. 26, 29 (Summer 2000). 
38 See id.; Bach, supra note 9. 
39 See Bach, supra note 9. The use of false evidence is an interrogation tactic in which 
police make a suspect believe that there is an overwhelming amount of evidence that he or 
she is guilty. See id. 
40 See Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children's Suggestibility Research: A Critique, 84 
CORNELL L. REv. 1004, 1011 (1999); An Obligation to Protect the Children, supra note 8. 
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agree to things that are factually inaccurate .... If what one 
wants is a confession, [the type of interview technique cur-
rently used] will get it. It will unfortunately ... get it from 
the guilty and get it from the innocent.41 
Another danger in police interrogations is that juveniles will 
readily agree to an officer's words without understanding the 
significant implications of these words.42 For example, one attorney 
described his experiences representing Latasha, a thirteen-year-old 
juvenile who was charged with first-degree murder.43 The police filled 
her confession with "planning words" and words suggesting "agree-
ment" between Latasha and her codefendant.44 According to 
Latasha's attorney, "[t]his common police practice is far too sophisti-
cated for a kid to pick up as he or she readily initials each page of the 
confession, skipping over words that have no specific meaning to 
them. "45 Latasha, a thirteen-year-old charged with murder and inter-
rogated without an attorney present, could neither convey nor under-
stand the subtle distinction between what the police suggested hap-
pened-there was an "agreement" with her boyfriend to commit 
murder-and the "acquiescence" to an older boyfriend that her story 
suggested.46 This subtle distinction probably had a large impact on 
Latasha's disposition, however, because mere acquiescence would 
have made her less culpable under criminallaw.47 Instead, Latasha's 
statement made it difficult for her attorneys to convince a jury that 
she did not have the requisite intent to be convicted on a charge of 
first-degree intentional homicide.48 
Additionally, false confessions and admissions to inaccurate 
statements are often ajuvenile's reaction to a perceived threat.49 Chil-
dren will take the blame for crimes they did not commit just to make 
the interrogation cease.50 According to child psychologist Marty 
Beyer, this is especially true for children of color (as A.M. and the 
boys in the Harris case were), as well as for victims of physical and 
41 See An Obligation to Protect the Children, supra note 8. 
42 See Young, supra note 8, at 16. 
43 See id. at 15. 
H See id. at 16. 
45 [d. 
46 See id. 
47 See Young, supra note 8, at 16. 
48 See id. 
49 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 27. 
50 See id. at 29-30. 
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sexual abuse.51 For example, several of the youths in Dr. Beyer's study 
reported that a fear of police made them feel that they had to confess; 
she writes, "[h]aving been powerless when adults abused them in the 
past, these young people probably could not do anything but comply 
with police. "52 Furthermore, some adolescents, especially younger ju-
veniles, may be excessively compliant.53 These juveniles may feel com-
pelled to give answers adults want.54 This propensity may be especially 
strong when the adults are authority figures such as police officers.55 
Finally, inaccurate statements may be the result of comparatively 
"immature" juvenile thought processes.56 Experts suggest that adoles-
cents may see different options than an adult would when faced with a 
decision.57 Juveniles may also place a different value on their options 
than adults, such as emphasizing peer approval as a factor in the deci-
sion.58 Furthermore, juveniles differ in their identification of the pos-
sible consequences that may follow from the options they are consid-
ering.59 For example, younger adolescents may not be able to think 
"strategically" when making statements, especially in such emotion-
ally charged circumstances as a police interrogation.60 
Using Latasha to demonstrate these characteristics of a juvenile 
may be particularly helpful. When Latasha was initially interrogated 
without an attorney present, she made several confessions of various 
actions to which her co-defendant, an older boyfriend, also admit-
ted.61 At one point, she said that she had found the cord used to 
strangle the victim from a room in her own house.62 Meanwhile, her 
seventeen-year-old boyfriend, who actually committed the murder, 
had already confessed that he had obtained the cord from a different 
51 See id. at 27. 
52 See id. at 35. 
5~ See id. at 32. 
54 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 32; Bach, supra note 9. 
55 See Bach, supra note 9. 
56 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 29. 
57 See, e.g., Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk-Taking In Adolescence: A Decision Making 
Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 1,6 (1992). 
58 See id. at 7. 
59 See id. at 6. For example, "adults may imagine that refusing to smoke marijuana 
could lead to only minor peer rejection among adolescents ... whereas adolescents may 
imagine a much larger dose of peer rejection. HId. 
60 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 29-30; Thomas Grisso, juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: 
New Questions for an Era of Punitive juvenile justice Reform, in MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: 
RETHINKING ASSESSMENT, COMPETENCY AND SENTENCING FOR A HARSHER ERA OF JUVE-
NILE JUSTICE 28 (Am. Bar Ass'n, 1997). 
61 See Young, supra note 8, at 16. 
62 See id. 
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room.63 After her lawyer "spent months in patient and often difficult 
discussions with Latasha in order to work through her teenage fears 
and misperceptions of reality," he learned that this particular admis-
sion of Latasha's was false. 64 
It seems that Latasha was simply protecting her boyfriend by as-
suming some of the responsibility of the crime, not an unusual occur-
rence in juvenile confessions.65 Some experts believe that instead of 
considering what an adult may view as the worst possible outcome-
getting punished himself-a juvenile'S sense of morality may be over-
shadowed by a sense of loyalty to others.66 In one study, Dr. Beyer dis-
cusses one adolescent who thought falsely confessing and taking the 
blame for an adult friend was the "right" thing to do.67 This same 
friend assured him that because of his age and his lack of a delin-
quent record, he would get a mild juvenile sanction.68 Along the same 
lines, there is also a strong belief among juveniles that informing on 
others, such as a boyfriend or girlfriend or fellow gang member, is 
morally wrong, a concept that Dr. Beyer says many adults do not un-
derstand.69 
Juveniles' susceptibility to suggestion, coupled with their imma-
ture thought processes, has serious consequences when they are in-
terrogated by individuals who do not recognize these limitations. 70 
Whether through leading and suggestive questions or because of a 
juvenile'S innate fears, if he is compelled to give answers he is uncom-
fortable giving, his constitutional right against self-incrimination may 
be violated.71 This is true regardless of whether the interrogation is 
objectively threatening.72 Furthermore, some crimes, such as the first-
degree murder charge on which Latasha was convicted, require the 
establishment of premeditation and intent.73 However, "[d]etermin-
ing intent in juveniles requires understanding adolescent develop-
ment"74 in general and where a particular child is in his development. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 See id.; Beyer, supra note 37, at 33. 
66 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 27. 
67 See id. at 33. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. at 33-34 
70 See id. at 35. 
71 See discussion infra Part N. 
72 See id. 
73 See Young, supra note 8, at 16. 
74 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 27. 
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Investigators must realize that juveniles often follow others out of loy-
alty or are easily coerced into situations that they may not have antici-
pated or planned.75 Again, however, through the use of subtle coer-
cion, such as leading questions and using "significant" words that kids 
may not understand, police officers may suggest or create the requi-
site intent for a serious criminal charge.76 In an era in which adoles-
cents are increasingly tried as adults, juveniles may be, literally, sign-
ing their lives away.77 There is also the important consideration, of 
course, that "[s]ociety is no safer when a seven- or eight- year-old boy 
... is convicted of a crime the child didn't commit because the police 
bullied a confession out of him" and the actual perpetrator remains 
free. 78 
II. MISUNDERSTANDING MIRANDA 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court deter-
mined that "[p]rior to any questioning, [a] person must be warned 
that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he does 
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to 
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. "79 The 
Court's decision was based on its belief that automatic procedures 
were necessary to ensure that an individual was aware of and under-
stood his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.8o 
The United States Supreme Court has never specifically held that 
Miranda warnings apply to juveniles.81 However, one year after 
Miranda, the Supreme Court decided In re Gault, a landmark case in 
75 See id. at 35. 
76 See id. at 27; Young, supra note 8, at 16. 
77 See, e.g., Young, supra note 8, at 16; Blumner, supra note 8. 
78 See Blumner, supra note 8. According to an article in The Nation referring to A.M.'s 
case, "the police ignored the telltale signs of a forced confession," such as "the suspect's 
narrative not matching known facts of the case." See Bach, supra note 9. Even though A.M. 
confessed to tying the victim up with a rope hanging from a plant, the victim, in fact, had 
been bound by a telephone cord. See id. Additionally, 
Id. 
[c]ourt-appointed psychologists found no evidence that A.M. was capable of 
murder, and in fact were so skeptical of his guilt that they recommended he 
not be placed in a locked, out-of-state residential facility .... One of the doc-
tors even remarked that the boy would have little need for any psychiatric 
treatment if it weren't for the grueling proceedings around the murder inves-
tigation. 
79 384 u.s. 436, 444 (1966). 
80 See id. 
8l See, e.g., Chao, supra note I, at 524. 
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juvenile law.82 The Court's lengthy discussion made clear that a juve-
nile has the right against self-incrimination and that "[t]he language 
of the Fifth Amendment ... is unequivocal and without exception. "83 
In a limited holding,84 the Court went on to decide that ajuvenile who 
may be committed to a state institution, as well as his parents, must be 
advised of his right to representation by counse1.85 Furthermore, "an 
admission by the juvenile may [not] be used against him in the ab-
sence of clear and unequivocal evidence that the admission was made 
with knowledge that he was not obliged to speak and would not be 
penalized for remaining silent. "86 
It is important to understand the basis upon which the Court 
came to this conclusion. The Court was deeply concerned that even in 
the then-rehabilitative and paternalistic atmosphere of the juvenile 
court, the reality was that a juvenile may be "committed to an institu-
tion where he may be restrained of liberty for years. "87 It emphasized 
that the Fifth Amendment protects against a defendant's incriminat-
ing statement because of "the exposure which it invites" and the dep-
rivation of liberties it may entai1.88 
In the thirty-five years since In re Gault, this discussion has be-
come increasingly relevant.89 For example, legislatures in recent years 
have passed laws in all fifty states allowing juveniles to be tried in adult 
courts and sent to adult prisons.90 Furthermore, according to Amnesty 
International: 
82 See In reGault, 387 U.s. 1, 1 (1966). 
83 See id. at 47. 
84 See id. at 1. The Court specifically said that its holding "relates only to the adjudica-
tory stage of the juvenile process, where commitment to a state institution may follow.» Id. 
85 See id. at 1-2. 
86 Id. at 2 (alteration in original). 
87 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 26-27. Indeed, the Court was appalled that the fifteen-
year-old in question, Gerry Gault, was sentenced to a state institution until he reached his 
eighteenth birthday for making an obscene phone call. See id. at 1, 29. The Court pointed 
out that "[iJf Gerald had been over 18, he would not have been subject to Juvenile Court 
proceedings. For the particular offense immediately involved, the maximum punishment 
would have been a fine of $5 to $50, or imprisonment in jail for not more than two 
months." Id. at 29. 
88 See id. at 49-50. 
89 See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 37, at 35. Half of the juveniles involved in Dr. Beyer's study 
faced the death penalty or adult sentences without parole. See id; see also Grisso, supra note 
60, at 27. Dr. Grisso writes, "As adjudication in juvenile courts has become more similar to 
criminal courts in their process and potential outcomes, the argument that youths should 
be competent to stand trial ... has increased." See Grisso, supra note 60, at 27. 
90 See Fox Butterfield, With Juvenile Courts in Chaos, Some Propose Scrapping Them, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 1997,atAI6. 
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During the past 20 years, in response to public concern 
about the extent and nature of crimes committed by young 
people, [state] governments have significantly expanded the 
role of the general criminal justice system with respect to 
children and generally increased the severity of sanctions 
that courts may impose on children.91 
365 
The report goes on to say that, according to the most recent data 
available, "about 200,000 children a year are prosecuted in general 
criminal courts; more than 11,000 children are in prisons and other 
long-term adult correctional facilities; and, more than 2000 children 
are housed in the general population of adult prisons. "92 
Simply put, juveniles have increasingly more liberty to lose when 
they are arrested and interrogated.93 Thus, state and federal courts 
have consistently warned that special care must be taken to ensure 
that a juvenile understands that he has a constitutional right against 
self-incrimination.94 Furthermore, when a juvenile makes incriminat-
ing statements, courts have consistently looked to whether the waiver 
of that right was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily to en-
sure proper due process.95 
91 Betraying the Young Children in the U.S. Justice System, 1998 AMNESTY IT'L 12 [hereinaf-
ter, Betraying the Young Children]. 
92 See id. at 11-12. 
95 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 27; Betraying the Young Children, supra note 91, at 12. 
94 See, e.g., Statev. Presha, 748A.2d 1108, 1117 (NJ. 2000): 
Although a suspect is always free to waive the privilege and confess to commit-
ting crimes, that waiver must never be the product of police coercion ... the 
requirement ofvoluntariness applies equally to adult and juvenile confessions 
... [and] younger offenders present a special circumstance in the context of 
police interrogation. 
Id. at 1113-14; see also In reE.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 939-40 (Vt. 1982): 
Id. 
This State, like all others, has recognized the fact that juveniles many times 
lack the capacity and responsibility to realize the full consequences of their 
actions .... It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one 
whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic 
beverages, or even donate their own blood, should be compelled to stand on 
the same footing as an adult when asked to waive important ... rights at a 
time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar. 
Therefore ... criteria must be met for a juvenile to voluntarily and intelli-
gently waive his rights against self-incrimination .... 
95 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. AJuvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 656 (Mass. 1983); In reE.T.C., 
449 A.2d at 940. 
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Courts and legislatures have generally taken one of two ap-
proaches to determine whether a Fifth Amendment right was prop-
erly waived.96 The majority of states apply a totality of the circum-
stances test.97 This is modeled after the one used for adults to 
determine whether they properly waived their Fifth Amendment 
right.98 The Supreme Court adopted this approach in Fare v. Michael 
c., where it said that the "totality-of-the-circumstances approach is 
adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where 
interrogation of juveniles is involved. ''99 Under the totality approach, 
courts have traditionally examined factors such as the suspect's age, 
education, intelligence, whether he was advised of his constitutional 
rights, and the length and nature of detention.lOO The factors that a 
particular court applies, as well as the weight judges assign to these 
factors, are usually matters of judicial discretion and vary among 
courts. 101 
Other states, however, have rejected the totality test and, instead, 
have adopted per se exclusionary rules. I02 These rules are largely 
based on the Supreme Court's discussion in Gallegos v. Colorado that 
adult advice is valuable in ensuring the voluntariness of a juvenile's 
waiver and the Court's recognition that immaturity may render a 
youth helpless to assert his rights.I03 In states using a per se rule, a 
statement is rendered automatically inadmissible if it does not follow 
statutory guidelines, such as having a parent or another interested 
adult present when the statement is made. I04 The per se rule is based 
on a public policy determination that juveniles do not have the capac-
ity to understand or waive their right against incrimination and so 
they need an adult's help to make this decision.lo5 
96 See Thomas Grisso, juveniles , Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Ana9sis, 
68 CAL. L. REv. 1134, 1134-35 (1980); David T. Huang, Note, "Less Unequal Footing": State 
Courts' PerSe Rulesfor Implementation, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 437, 440 (2001). 
97 See Presha, 748A2d at 1117. . 
98 SeeFarev. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-77). 
99 See id. 
100 See Presha, 748 A2d at 1113. 
101 See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1138. 
102 See Presha, 748 A2d at 1120-21. 
109 See 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). The Court wrote, "we deal with a person who is not 
equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions 
and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to protect his own interests or 
how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights." Id. 
104 See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1135; Huang, supra note 96, at 440. 
105 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. AJuvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 658; Presha, 748 A2d at 1114-15. 
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The fact that several states have explicitly made this determina-
tion and adopted a per se exclusionary rule begs the question: Are 
juveniles capable of knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving 
their constitutional rights?106 Empirical studies emphatically suggest 
that the answer is no.107 For example, Dr. Thomas Grisso's statistical 
evidence shows that a mcyority of delinquent youths are learning dis-
abled, which compounds their problem of comprehension. lOS Dr. 
Grisso's studies also conclude, in part, that juveniles demonstrate less 
understanding of the wording in the Miranda warnings than do 
adults; that juveniles are more likely than adults to misunderstand the 
function of legal counsel, thus not realizing the benefits and protec-
tion that lawyers can give them; and, that many juveniles do not un-
derstand that they truly have a "right" to remain silent.109 He further 
notes that juveniles fifteen and younger are especially unable to com-
prehend the concepts involved in a Miranda warning.110 
Dr. Grisso's findings have been replicated in subsequent stud-
ies.lll For example, in Dr. Beyer's study, ten of seventeen juveniles 
could not demonstrate an adequate understanding of the words of 
the Miranda warning.1l2 She describes how one fourteen year old ex-
plained ''You have the right to remain silent" as "Don't make noise."1l3 
He explained the phrasing "Anything you say can be used against 
you" as meaning "You better talk to the police."1l4 Furthermore, there 
is evidence that juveniles may misperceive the function of counsel.l15 
One study found that one-third of the juveniles believed that it was 
important to be truthful because a lawyer could report the defen-
dant's guilt to the court.1l6 
Finally, research suggests that young adolescents may not see a 
"right" as an entitlement but, instead, as something that can be taken 
away by authorities.ll7 These youths, then, may not realize that a 
106 See Chao, supra note 1, at 522. 
107 See id. at 526. 
108 See id. These data are largely the work of Thomas Grisso, whose 1980 study of juve-
niles is often quoted by courts. See id. 
109 See Chao, supra note 1, at 526; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1151-60. 
110 See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1160. 
111 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 28. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 3l. 
116 See id. 
117 See id. at 29. 
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"right" belongs to them and is something that they can assert. llS This 
becomes problematic during a juvenile interrogation because "[t]he 
accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a 
request may be the person who most needs counsel."1l9 
The Supreme Court, writing about criminal defendant Miranda 
himself, opined, "[t]he mere fact that he signed a statement which 
contained a typed-in clause stating that he had 'full knowledge' of his 
'legal rights' does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver 
required to relinquish constitutional righ ts. "120 In an akin situation, if 
a juvenile does not understand what his right to silence means or does 
not understand how a lawyer can help him or does not realize that his 
statements will be used against him-regardless of whether he recants 
upon being released or seeing his parents-it seems that these rights 
cannot have been waived intelligently and voluntarily.l21 
III. PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 
Juveniles may not have the capacity to understand what their le-
gal right against self-incrimination entails. Thus, if juveniles do not 
know what they possess in the first instance, they cannot properly 
waive this right, lending to a violation of the Fifth Amendment.122 Fur-
thermore, because juveniles have immature thought processes that 
make them susceptible to suggestion and prevent them from realizing 
the long-term consequences of their statements, they are extremely 
vulnerable to overimplicating themselves or even making wholly false 
confessions.123 
To protect the rights and interests of juveniles, states must enact 
several safeguards. First, courts which currently use a totality of cir-
cumstances test to determine whether the confession of a juvenile six-
teen or younger is voluntary should abandon it in favor of a per se 
rule of admissibility.124 Such a per se rule would exclude the admissi-
bility of any statements made by juveniles sixteen and under when an 
interested adult such as a parent, guardian, or lawyer is not present.125 
118 See id. 
119 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470-71. 
120 Id. at 492. 
121 See id.; Grisso, supra note 60, at 31. 
122 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 31. 
123See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35; Young, supra note 8, at 16; An Obligation to Protect the 
Children, supra note 8; Blumner, supra note 8. 
124 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d 1302, 1312 (Kan. 1998). 
125 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. and notes 204-211. 
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Additionally, the Miranda warning must be explained and understood 
by both the juvenile and adult.126 If such an adult was present when an 
incriminating statement was made, the burden is on the defense to 
show that the statement was not voluntary. For instance, the defense 
could present evidence that a juvenile's parent compelled him to 
speak to an officer or that the interested adult did not comprehend 
the concepts in the Miranda warnings well enough to render ad-
vice.127 
For juveniles older than sixteen, the per se rule should not ap-
ply.128 Instead, there should be a rebuttable presumption based on the 
preponderance of the evidence standard that the statement was not 
given voluntarily. Prosecutors can overcome this presumption by 
showing that an interested adult was present and that the adult had a 
meaningful consultation with the juvenile.I29 Also, showing that a ju-
venile's parent or guardian was aware of his arrest and that the juve-
nile was given the opportunity to have such a person present would 
also strongly favor overcoming the presumption.130 On the contrary, a 
prosecutor could not overcome this burden if there is evidence that 
the police deliberately excluded a juvenile'S parent or legal guardian 
from the interrogation. l3l 
Finally, states need to enact procedural safeguards to ensure that 
constitutional rights are waived properly and that statements are reli-
able. For instance, the Miranda warning needs to be simplified into 
language more appropriate for juveniles and incorporated into a ju-
venile waiver form. 132 Additionally, interrogators need to cease using 
the same tactics on children as they do on adults, such as the use of 
leading questions and presentation of false evidence.I33 
126 See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text. 
127 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. AJuvenile, 449 N.E.2d 654, 657 (Mass. 1983). 
128 See discussion infra Part IIIA.2. and notes 219-226. 
129 See infra notes 203-204 and accompanying text. 
1~ Seeid. 
m See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1305. 
U2 See discussion infra Part III.B. and notes 252-257. 
133 See infra notes 263-266. 
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A. Abandon the Totality Test 
1. The Case of B.M.B. 
The totality test currently used by states to determine if a waiver 
was proper is problematic for several reasons.I34 First, as several com-
mentators have pointed out, it only serves to protect a juvenile retro-
spectively, after he may have improperly waived his rights. I35 In effect, 
the totality test serves as a remedy rather than a safeguard.I36 In 
Miranda, however, the Supreme Court's entire premise is that an indi-
vidual's Fifth Amendment right is "fundamental to our system of con-
stitutional rule" and, therefore, great care must be taken to ensure 
the State does not infringe upon this right.137 Because a per se rule 
acts prospectively to prevent such an infringement in the first place, it 
encompasses a value system more in line with constitutional intent. I38 
Another problem with the totality test is that the determination 
of whether ajuvenile's rights were disregarded is entirely based on the 
discretion of judges, which leads to inconsistency from case to case. I39 
Police interrogators are then left with only rough guidelines, which 
may be too flexible to be useful and which may allow police to take 
advantage of a youth's immaturity. 140 Another way in which the totality 
test falters concerns the factors that are used to analyze whether a 
confession is voluntary. HI For instance, many courts look to a juve-
134 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1138-40; Huang, supra 
note 96, at 448-49. 
135 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312. As the Supreme Court of Kansas pointed out, this 
has especially deleterious effects on juveniles. See id. at 1311-12. The Court wrote: 
Our determination that respondent has not proved a valid waiver, however 
... is consistent with the protective ethic of our juvenile law that at the accu-
satory stage of the process a juvenile have ... guidance as to whether he will 
waive his constitutional rights ... to remain silent .... And since a juvenile 
who confesses at the accusatory state has, in most instances, already had his 
trial, to deprive him at that state of ... assistance would render meaningless 
[protective measures taken during trial]. 
Id. (quoting In re K.W.B., 500 S.W.2d 275, 281-82 (Mo. Ct. App.1973»; see also Huang, 
supra note 96, at 449. 
136 See Huang, supra note 96, at 449. 
137 See 384 U.S. 436, 468 (1966). 
138 See id. at 469; Huang, supra note 96, at 449. 
139 See discussion infra Part IV. 
140 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 657 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 
442 U.S. 707, 718 (1979»; Huang, supra note 96, at 472. 
141 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 30 (noting that age and prior experience are not in-
dicative of a juveniles' ability to understand his constitutional rights). 
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nile's prior arrest experience, theorizing that if he has been previ-
ously exposed to an arrest and a Miranda warning, he has a better 
understanding of what rights are implicated the next time. 142 How-
ever, research has shown that a juvenile's repeated exposure toa 
Miranda warning does not necessarily make it more understand-
able.143 
Additionally, courts often analyze whether a juvenile was advised 
of his rights. l44 However, just because a Miranda warning is given and 
a juvenile indicates that he understands his rights does not mean that 
this is necessarily the case. l45 Again, even if a juvenile realizes that 
"These statements may be used against you," he may not understand 
the long-term consequences of his statements or may not understand 
that a right is something that belongs to him and cannot be taken 
away by the law officer.l46 As Dr. Grisso writes, even when juveniles are 
interrogated "under optimal conditions . .. [they are] not immune 
from comprehension inhibitions. "147 
Finally, courts will often look to the age of the juvenile.l48 How-
ever, Dr. Beyer argues that "adolescent development is not a linear 
progression tied to chronological age. "149 Just as a fifteen-year-old ju-
venile does not think like a twenty-year-old adult, he may not think in 
the same way as the fifteen year old with whom he was arrested. 150 In 
addition, many arrested juveniles have suffered from physical or sex-
ual abuse, which can delay adolescent development. 151 Thus, many 
juveniles' thought processes may be more immature than their 
chronological age would suggest.152 
In re B.M.B., a 1998 decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas153 
illustrates the problems inherent in using totality tests to determine 
whether a statement was voluntarily given. B.M.B. was a ten-year-old 
boy accused of sexually assaulting a four-year-old neighbor while they 
142 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1307; State v. Presha, 748 A.2d 1108, 1112 (NJ. 
2000); Commonwealth v. Christmas, 465 A.2d 989, 993 (Pa. 1983). 
14~ See Grisso, supra note 60, at 30. 
144 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1307; Presha, 748 A.2d at 1112. 
145 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 28; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1160. 
146 See id. 
147 Grisso, supra note 96, at 1161. 
146 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1307; Presha, 748 A.2d at 1112; Christmas, 465 A.2d 
at 993. 
149 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35. 
150 See id.; Grisso, supra note 60, at 30. 
lSI See Beyer, supra note 37, at 34-35. 
152 See id. at 35. 
1M See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1302. 
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and her seven-year-old brother were playing together.154 At one point, 
while the two boys were burying the four year old in the sand, she got 
out and ran into the house screaming.155 Although the boys believed 
it was because she had seen a worm in the sand, when her mother 
asked her what happened, she said that "a boy" had tried to stick his 
"finger up [her] butt."156 Police, believing that the girl had adequately 
identified B.M.B. as the assailant, attempted to question him.157 An 
investigator left several phone messages with B.M.B.'s mother, indicat-
ing that she should get in touch with the police.158 Finally, under the 
belief that B.M.B. would soon be leaving to spend the summer with an 
uncle, the officer removed him from his fourth grade class and took 
him for questioning-all without trying to contact his mother 
again. 159 
Once at the station, the officer had B.M.B. read the Miranda 
form, "going over each sentence with him, "160 and had B.M.B. initial 
each sentence, as if to indicate his understanding.161 Although the 
officer asked B.M.B. if he wanted his mother present, the ten-year-old 
indicated that he did not.162 The officer began questioning the boy, 
and, about twenty minutes later, the officer was told B.M.B.'s mother 
had called,163 However, the officer never told B.M.B. that his mother 
was on the way to the police station. 1M Instead, he concluded the in-
terrogation before B.M.B.'s mother arrived.l65 B.M.B. was subse-
quently adjudicated as a youthful offender for the rape of the four-
year-old,166 He appealed the adjudication, contending an erroneous 
admission of his confession.167 
The trial court rejected B.M.B.'s motion to suppress his state-
ments to the police.168 At the time of B.M.B.'s trial, Kansas courts ap-
plied a totality test, considering such factors as the age of the minor, 
154 See id. at 1304. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. 
157 See id. 
158 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1304. 
159 See id. at 1305. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
162 See id. 
163 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1305. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. at 1302. 
167 See id. at 1304, 1306. 
168 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1306. 
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the length of the questioning, the youth's prior experience with the 
police, his education, and his mental state.169 However, when assessing 
these factors, the trial judge merely mentioned that B.M.B. was ten 
years old and admitted that "[she knew] nothing about [B.M.B.]'s 
maturity," although she noted that he could read and writePO 
The trial court judge never made any mention of B.M.B.'s prior 
experience with the police, supposedly one of the factors to be ap-
plied under this test. l7l She emphasized, "I'm more impressed, how-
ever, with [B.M.B.] 's comment that he would simply do his homework 
while waiting for paperwork to be processed, rather than being de-
scribed as tearful or overwrought. There is no indication at this point 
that [B.M.B.] had any hesitation with regard to speaking to this De-
tective. "172 The trial judge allowed all of B.M.B.'s incriminating state-
ments into evidenceP3 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Kansas took issue with the trial 
judge'S assessment of B.M.B.'s mental state, indicating that the fact 
that B.M.B. wanted to do his homework after the interrogation was of 
"questionable relevance."174 The court also implicitly disagreed with 
the trial judge's decision to place so much weight on B.M.B. 's appar-
ent calm mental state.175 Furthermore, the opinion said that another 
"shortcoming in the trial court's consideration" was its omission of the 
fact that the detective had deliberately continued and finished his in-
terrogation before B.M.B.'s mother had arrivedP6 The Supreme 
Court of Kansas subsequently held that B.M.B. did not, and, in fact, 
could not properly waive his constitutional rights, saying "[f]or all in-
tents and purposes, the State and trial court treated B.M.B. as if he 
were an adult or at least a much older teenager. "177 
In re B.M.B. highlights the fundamental problem of inconsistency 
in the totality test.178 The trial judge and the Supreme Court of Kansas 
examined the same set of circumstances and supposedly applied them 
to the same set of factorsP9 Despite this fact, some factors, such as 
169 See id at 1307. 
170 See id. at 1306. 
171 See id. at 1307. 
172Id. at 1306. 
173 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1302. 
174 See id. at 1308. 
175 See id. at 1307-08. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. at 1312. 
178 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1308. 
179 See id. at 1307. 
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B.M.B.'s mental state, were evaluated differently based on subjective 
assessments of the judges.I80 Whether individual factors should be 
considered at all and the determination of relative weight of the fac-
tors differed greatly from the trial judge to the Supreme Court of 
Kansas. I81 If judges who "know" the law come to such dramatically dif-
ferent conclusions based on their discretion, it may be equally, if not 
more, difficult for the police officer who is conducting an interroga-
tion to make an accurate prospective assessment of whether a juvenile 
intelligently and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrim-
ination.l82 Also troubling was the trial judge's emphasis on the fact 
that B.M.B. had read the Miranda form and initialed it, indicating 
that he understood his rights.l83 Again, reading about rights is not 
equivalent to comprehending them.I84 
2. Adopting the Per Se Rule 
The Supreme Court of Kansas implicitly recognized the problems 
involved in the totality test, "persuaded by what occurred in the pres-
ent case. "185 Mter determining that B.M.B.'s waiver was not proper, 
the Court went on to set a new standard that no statement or confes-
sion from a child under the age of fourteen could be used against him 
unless he had consulted with a parent, guardian, or attorney, who also 
must have been advised of the child's rights.l86 
The opinion stated: 
We cannot ignore the immaturity and inexperience of a 
child under 14 years of age and the obvious disadvantage 
such a child has in confronting a custodial police interroga-
tion. In such a case, we conclude that the totality of the cir-
cumstances is not sufficient to ensure that the child makes 
an intelligent and knowing waiver of his rights. I87 
180 See id. at 1307-08. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. at 1311. 
183 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1306-07. 
184 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 28; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1160. 
185 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312. 
186 See id. at 1312-13. 
187Id. at 1312. 
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Furthermore, it stated that requiring the advice of a parent or coun-
selor is "relatively simple" and was "well-established as a safeguard 
against ajuvenile's improvident judicial acts."188 
Other jurisdictions have recently enacted similar safeguards, 
whether by statute or judicial decree.189 For example, in March 2000, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey said in State v. Presha that "special 
circumstances exist when a juvenile is under the age of fourteen. "190 It 
held that, in such instances, an adult's absence will render ajuvenile's 
statement inadmissible as a matter oflaw.l91 
Similarly, in April 2000, Illinois lawmakers passed a measure re-
quiring anyone younger than age thirteen to have a lawyer before fac-
ing police questioning in homicide and sexual assault cases.192 The 
statute requires that the police, at the very least, allow the juvenile to 
speak with an attorney over the phone before the police can begin 
their interrogation.193 The legislation falters, however, in its failure to 
realize that the presence of a lawyer or other adult serves dual pur-
poses.194 While a telephone call to an attorney, perhaps, can provide a 
juvenile help in understanding his constitutional rights, the juvenile 
will still be disadvantaged if an adult is not physically present to act as 
a buffer against coercion or intimidation.l95 The original proposal for 
the legislation took this into consideration and mandated that state-
ments taken without a lawyer present would be strictly inadmissible.l96 
188 See id. (quoting In re Dino, 359 So.2d 586, 591-93 (La. 1978». 
189 See Presha, 748 A.2d at III 0; Christi Parsons & Ryan Keith, Bill Offers Legal Aid to 
Kids in Homicide Legislation in Reaction to Ryan Harris Case, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2000, at 1. 
190 748 A.2d at 1110. 
191 See id. 
192 See Parsons & Keith, supra note 189. 
19~ See id. However, the measure has been criticized as being irrelevant. See id. For in-
stance, it would only cover juveniles under age thirteen. See id. Chicago, in 1999, did not 
have any arrests of juveniles under the age of thirteen for murder, and had only forty-two 
arrests for sexual assault. See id. However, thirty-nine juveniles younger than seventeen 
were arrested for murder and 159 were arrested for criminal sexual assaults. See Parsons & 
Keith, supra note 189. Furthermore, juveniles who commit murder or sexual assault are 
not the only ones being locked up in juvenile or adult facilities. See Betraying the Young Chil-
dren, supra note 91, at 14. According to an Amnesty International study conducted in No-
vember 1998, "in 15 states, children accused of committing non-violent offenses such as 
burglary, offenses involving weapons and drug offenses must be prosecuted in general 
criminal courts." Id. 
194 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113-14; Huang, supra note 96, at 472. 
195 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113-14; Huang, supra note 96, at 472. Commentators have 
explicitly pointed out several other advantages of having an adult present during a juvenile 
interrogation. For example, having an adult present provides an additional witness to tes-
tifY as to the coerciveness of the interrogation. See Huang, supra note 96, at 472. 
196 See Parsons & Keith, supra note 189. 
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It also required a lawyer for any criminal suspect younger than eight-
een.197 However, law enforcement groups decried these strict propos-
als, maintaining that such restrictions would make it difficult for them 
to perform their jobs.198 
As the above examples demonstrate, states that have enacted per 
se rules are not uniform in their requirements. l99 The particular nu-
ances and requirements of a statute are public policy determinations, 
which seek to balance the protection of a community against the pro-
tection of a juvenile 's constitutional rights.2oo For example, some states 
require merely the immediate notification of a minor's guardian or 
custodian if a minor is taken into custody so that statements made by 
juveniles where no notification has been made have been sup-
pressed.201 However, because this standard does not require an inter-
ested adult's presence for support and ongoing consultation, it does 
not provide adequate protection.202 
Other states, such as Colorado and Indiana, have enacted statutes 
that render inadmissible any statement by a juvenile made during the 
interrogation outside the presence of an interested adult, such as a 
parent or attorney.203 This author believes that the latter view is the 
best way to provide protection for a juvenile. When an interested 
adult is present, such an adult can provide advice so that the juvenile 
better understands his rights, as well as protect the juvenile from the 
"compelling atmosphere" of custodial interrogation.204 Courts have 
noted that the presence of a parent to act as a "buffer" is especially 
197 See id. 
198 See id. 
199 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1119-22. In this case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey dis-
cusses the judicial and legislative requirements of various states' per se rules, distinguish-
ing, for instance, states which require the presence of an interested adult versus states 
which only require notification of a parent or guardian if a juvenile is arrested. See id. 
200 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1311. The Supreme Court of Kansas discusses various 
states' articulations as to why per se rules were adopted. See id. at 1311-12. 
2QI See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1121. Proponents of per se rules often argue that juveniles 
do not understand the benefit of having a lawyer present and would not, therefore, invoke 
their Sixth Amendment privilege. Presumably, states that have mandated per se rules 
which require only notification to a parent or guardian once a juvenile has been arrested 
have done so with the belief that once parents realize their child is in custody they will 
contact a lawyer for their child themselves. 
202 See id. at 1113-14; Huang, supra note 96, at 472. 
2Q3 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511 (West 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-
5-1 (Michie 1999). 
2Q4 See, e.g., State v. Benoit, 490 A.2d 295, 302 (N.H. 1985); Presha, 748 A.2d at 1113-
1114. 
2002] Interrogation of Juveniles 377 
significant now because there has been an increased focus on the ap-
prehension and prosecution of youth offenders.205 
The language used to require the consultation with or presence 
of an interested adult also varies from state to state.206 However, the 
requirement that the adult must be interested not only in the juve-
nile's general welfare but also his legal welfare seems to be implicitly 
uniform.207 For instance, Vermont requires that a juvenile be given 
the opportunity to consult with an adult "who is not only generally 
interested in the welfare of the juvenile but completely independent 
from and disassociated with the prosecution. "208 As well, the Supreme 
Court, in Gallegos v. Colorado, advised that juveniles should receive aid 
from "someone concerned with securing him ... rights. "209 It is ap-
parent, then, that a lawyer would fall under the interested adult stan-
dard.2lo Similarly, per se rules uniformly consider a parent or legal 
guardian to be an interested adult.2l1 
205 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1114. 
206 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312-13 (requiring that juveniles under the age of 
fourteen be given an opportunity to consult with "his or her parent, guardian, or attor-
ney."); In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 594 (stating that Lousiana's per se rule, which has since 
been abandoned, required consultation with "an attorney or an informed parent, guard-
ian, or other adult interested in his welfare .... "); Commonwealth v. AJuvenile, 449 N.E.2d 
at 657 (requiring "an interested adult" including an "informed parent, or person standing 
in loco parentis"); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 940 (Vt. 1982) (requiring the opportunity for 
consultation "with an adult ... who is not only generally interested in the welfare of the 
juvenile but completely independent from and disassociated with the prosecution, e.g., a 
parent, legal guardian, or attorney representing the juvenile."). 
207 See In re E. T.C., 449 A.2d at 940. 
208 See id. 
209 See 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962). In Fare v. Michael c., the Supreme Court explicitly re-
jected the argument that the juvenile had invoked his Fifth Amendment rights by request-
ing to speak to his probation officer because such a person: 
is not in a position to ... protect the Fifth Amendment rights of an accused 
undergoing custodial interrogation that a lawyer can offer .... He is 
significantly handicapped by the position he occupies in the juvenile system 
from serving as an effective protector of the rights of a juvenile suspected of a 
crime. 
442 U.S. at 722. 
210 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312-13; In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d at 940. Indeed, 
Thomas Grisso advises that having counsel always present for juveniles under the age of 
fifteen affords the best protection of juvenile's constitutional rights. See Grisso, supra note 
96, at 1163-64. 
m See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312-13; Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 
657; In re E.T.c., 449 A.2d at 940. An interesting argument, but one that is beyond the 
scope of this Note, may be made as to who else, in addition to the parent, guardian, or 
attorney, may constitute an interested adult. For instance, while In re B.M.B. only 
specifically mentions a "parent, guardian, or attorney," 955 P.2d at 1312-13, Vermont re-
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In addition to the variation in who may be present in a juvenile 
interrogation, the age at which a per se rule applies varies across ju-
risdictions.212 For example, Colorado's statute does not make refer-
ence to a specific applicable age, instead referring to "a juvenile."213 
As mentioned already, New Jersey's per se court mandate only applies 
to juveniles under the age of fourteen. 214 Interestingly, in Massachu-
setts the judiciary has created a two-tiered standard based on age.215 
There, a juvenile under fourteen can only properly waive his Fifth 
Amendment right if he has an interested adult present during inter-
rogation.216 For juveniles fourteen and over, however, there is a rebut-
table presumption that a waiver of rights is improper.217 If such a juve-
nile demonstrates "a high degree of intelligence, experience, 
knowledge, or sophistication," even if there is no interested adult pre-
sent during the interrogation, the waiver is valid and any incriminat-
ing statements may be entered into evidence.218 
Creating an age limit within a per se rule is a difficult determina-
tion because, as already noted, psychological development and con-
ceptual understanding of rights do not necessarily correlate to 
chronological age.219 Although studies show that younger juveniles 
are the most vulnerable to confusion about their rights, these studies 
also show that "there is much more variability in capacities among 
youths" in the age range of fourteen to sixteen.220 Furthermore, 
quires consultation "with an adult ... who is not only generally interested in the welfare of 
the juvenile but is completely independent from and disassociated with the prosecution, 
e.g., a parent, kgal guardian, or attorney representing the juvenik." See In re E. T.e., 449 A.2d at 
940 (emphasis added). This suggests that additional persons may be considered interested 
adults under the Vermont standard. See id. This may be especially important in situations 
in which, for instance, the crime was committed against the parent. See Chao, supra note 1, 
at 538. However, this opens the possibility of "an unlimited list of people [with] whom the 
juvenile could consult" and "which would serve as a per se invocation of the juvenile'S Fifth 
Amendment rights." See Robert E. Mcguire, Note, A Proposal to Strengthen Juvenik Miranda 
Rights: Requiring Parental Presence in Custodial Interrogations, 53 VAND. L. REv. 135;;, 1384 
(2000). 
212 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511; Presha, 748 A.2d at 1110; Parsons & 
Keith, supra note 189. 
m See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-511. 
214 See Presha, 748 A.2d at 1110. 
215 See Commonwealth v. A.Juvenik, 449 N.E.2d at 657. 
216 See id. 
217 See id.; Huang, supra note 96, at 453. 
218 See Commonwealth v. A Juvenik, 449 N .E.2d at 657; Huang, supra note 96, at 453. 
219 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35; Grisso, supra, note 60, at 30. 
220 See Grisso, supra note 60, at 30. 
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"[t]his variability gradually decreases until, in the older adolescent 
years, it is about the same as one finds among adults. "221 
Because of this variability, a Massachusetts-like per se rule that 
creates two distinct age-based tiers is necessary.222 Such a rule provides 
the optimal balance between recognizing cognitive limitations of 
younger juveniles and easing public fears that older "seasoned de lin-
quent[s]" may be overprotected.223 The ideal per se rule requires the 
presence of an interested adult for any juvenile sixteen years old and 
under, as studies show this age group is the one most likely to misun-
derstand, or not have the capacity to understand, their rights.224 
For juveniles over the age of sixteen, a rebuttable presumption 
that their constitutional rights were impermissibly waived most ade-
quately affords constitutional protection. For an older juvenile who 
may not have an adult capacity to understand his rights due to a 
learning disability, mental disorder, or slow cognitive development, 
the prosecutor may not be able to overcome this burden if an inter-
ested adult did not consult with the juvenile. 225 At the same time, such 
a rule recognizes that a mature juvenile only months away from adult 
status may not need an interested adult's consultation in order to ef-
fectuate his rights. 226 
221Id. 
222 See Com17Wnwealth v. Ajuvenil£, 449 N.E.2d at 657. 
22~ See Christmas, 465 A.2d at 993. 
224 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35; Grisso, supra note 60, at 30. 
225 See Commonwealth v. Ajuvenil£, 449 N.E.2d at 657. 
226 See Christmas, 465 A.2d at 991. The case of such a juvenile caused Pennsylvania to 
abandon its per se rule in 1983. See id. at 992. Importantly, Pennsylvania's per se rule pro-
vided that no juvenile under eighteen could waive his Miranda rights unless he was pro-
vided an opportunity to consult with an interested adult. See Huang, supra note 97, at 458. 
In 1983, the court heard Commonwealth v. Christmas, in which the defendant, who was 
merely four months away from his eighteenth birthday, was arrested for possession of 744 
packets of heroin. See 465 A.2d at 991. This was his eighteenth arrest. See id. at 993. Al-
though the defendant was allowed to consult with his father, himself a police officer, the 
father was never informed of his son's constitutional rights. See id. at 991. This violated 
Pennsylvania's per se rule, and his eventual incriminating remarks should have been dis-
qualified. See id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, was explicitly distressed 
over the age of the defendant and how close he was to becoming an adult. See id. at 991, 
993. It began its opinion by simply stating, "At the time of his arrest, appellee was ap-
proximately 17 years and 8 months of age." [d. at 991. It went on to mention again that "at 
the time of his arrest, appellee was just four months under the age of eighteen years." [d. at 
993. Finally, the opinion referred to the defendant as "a veteran arrestee," "a seasoned 
delinquent," and "not a naive and inexperienced youth needing the advice of an inter-
ested and informed adult." [d. Because the per se rule rested on the premise that 'Juvenile 
immaturity may preclude self-protection from overbearing police interrogation," and this 
defendant was not the naive juvenile it was meant to protect, the Court not only let in the 
incriminating statements, but reexamined the per se rule and decided to abandon it in 
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Notwithstanding the aforementioned advantages of the per se 
rule, opponents point out several flaws. 227 For instance, the interested 
adult standard may require the same worrisome judicial discretion as 
the totality test regarding who qualifies as an "interested adult. "228 
However, recognizing that parents may not always represent the best 
interests of their children and that an individual who is not a parent 
or guardian may be able to fulfill the role of an interested adult, this is 
a necessary danger.229 The possibility of an inconsistency is out-
weighed by the threshold of rights guaranteed. 
Additionally, some critics believe that requiring the presence of 
an interested adult is too cumbersome and costly.230 Illinois lawmakers 
considered this a key factor when they scaled down their per se rule to 
include only juveniles under thirteen who were accused of commit-
ting specific crimes and required only that such juveniles have a 
chance for a telephone conversation with a lawyer.231 Courts have also 
expressed these same concerns.232 For example, Chief Justice Sanders, 
writing for the dissent in In re Dino, lamented that he was "not pre-
pared ... to fasten upon our law enforcement officers ... inflexible 
rules ... under [which], when parents are unavailable, an investiga-
tion must be halted. The requirement of the presence of an attorney 
favor of a rebuttable presumption standard. See id. at 991-92. In effect, the Court reverted 
back to a totality of the circumstances test because, although the presumption that a 
statement made without the opportunity to consult with an interested and informed adult 
could be rebutted, this determination was made by a review of evidence to show whether 
the juvenile was in fact competent. See id. at 992. 
227 See, e.g., Fare, 442 u.s. at 725; Christmas, 465 A.2d at 992; Huang, supra note 96, at 
465-67. 
228 See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 599 (Sanders, Cj., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Huang, supra note 96, at 467. But compare In re B.M.B., where Justice AIle-
grucci of the Supreme Court of Kansas quotes the Louisiana Supreme Court: "the expedi-
ent of requiring the advice of a parent, counselor adviser [is] relatively simple." 955 P.2d 
at 1312 (quoting in In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 591-93). 
229 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 449 N.E.2d at 655. In this case, at a police 
officer's request, the father brought his two sons to the courthouse for questioning. See id. 
The officer explained the Miranda rights to the father, who, according to the officer's tes-
timony was "very upset." See id. In fact, he told his sons to tell the officer what they knew, 
and the two boys subsequently confessed to breaking and entering a sporting goods store. 
See id. at 657. Because the father insisted his sons tell the officer what they knew, it can be 
argued that he was not acting in their legal interests, as required by the per se rule. See id. 
at 655. 
230 See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 599 (Sanders, Cj., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); Parsons & Keith, supra note 189. 
231 See Parsons & Keith, supra note 189. 
232 See, e.g., In re Dino, 359 So.2d at 599 (Sanders, Cj., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
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adds one more costly burden to our already heavily burdened justice 
system. "233 
However, the proposed per se rule does offer some flexibility in 
that if a parent cannot be located or the juvenile does not desire the 
parent to be present, it still allows interrogation if a lawyer is present. 
Thus, law enforcement officers will not be forced to waste valuable 
investigation time, or hold the juvenile for an unnecessarily long time, 
while they search for ajuvenile's parent. 
In addition to the logistical burdens, other opponents express 
fear that per se rules will hamper police investigations.234 The Court 
in Fare v. Michael c., for instance, warned that a per se rule may im-
pose "rigid restraints on police and courts" in dealing with juvenile 
investigations.235 Interestingly, observers expressed the same concerns 
when the Supreme Court first created the Miranda warning.236 How-
ever, its utility in allowing police to carry out their duties in a manner 
that protects constitutional rights has become so accepted that the 
Miranda warning is now "part of our national culture. "237 
Like the Miranda warning, per se rules are procedural protec-
tions that "inform[s] police and prosecutors with specificity as to what 
they may do in conducting custodial interrogation, and [they inform] 
courts under what circumstances statements obtained during such 
interrogation are not admissible. "238 These inflexible guidelines not 
only protect the juvenile but serve society's interest as well.239 For ex-
ample, although there are clearly instances when juveniles overimpli-
cate themselves or confess to actions they did not take, at the same 
time, confessions that may be valid are getting thrown out under a 
totality of the circumstance test because police do not have a fixed 
mId. (Sanders, Cj., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
234 See, e.g., Fare, 442 U.S. at 725; Parsons & Keith, supra note 189. 
235 See 442 U.S. at 725. 
236 See Huang, supra note 96, at 474. The Supreme Court was "not unmindful of the 
burdens which law enforcement officials must bear .. , [so that] [t]he limits we have 
placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an undue interference with a 
proper system of law enforcement ... our decision does not in any way preclude police 
from carrying out their traditional investigatory functions." See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 481 (1966). 
237 See Huang, supra note 96, at 474 (quoting the Supreme Court opinion in Dickerson 
v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000». 
238 Fare, 442 U.S. at 718. 
239 See, e.g., Evans Osnos &julie Deardorff, JO-Year-Old's Slaying 'Confession' Barred, CHI. 
TluB., july 20, 1999, at 1; Teen Freed After Decision Rules Out His Confession, CINCINNATI EN-
QUIRER,june 9, 2000, at D02 [hereinafter Teen Freed]. 
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standard to follow when determining if a waiver is proper.240 Again, 
this determination will be left up to the judiciary, which is not consis-
tent in its application of subjective factors. 241 Clearer guidelines, if 
they are followed, may prevent this from happening. 
Opponents argue, however, that valid confessions still may be 
thrown out under per se rules-and juvenile delinquents may be set 
free-because of a "technicality. "242 This argument may be refuted 
when several premises are taken together and the language of 
Miranda v. Arizona is closely examined. First, and most importantly, 
under the Constitution, an individual's Fifth Amendment right is by 
no means a mere technicality.243 The Supreme Court in Miranda dis-
cussed, at length, the historical foundation and application of the 
"long recognized"244 right that is a fundamental aspect of our adver-
sary system.245 Additionally, the Court emphasized that individuals not 
only have this Constitutional right, but must be aware of it and under-
stand it to effectuate the right.246 This is why the Court found it neces-
sary to implement clear-cut procedures to ensure awareness and un-
derstanding in the form of the Miranda warning. 247 
240 See Osnos & Deardorff, supra note 239; Teen Freed, supra note 239. 
241 See discussion infra Part IV. 
242 See, e.g., Osnos & Deardorff, supra note 239. For instance, a confession may be 
thrown out because the Miranda warning was not explained to the interested adult. See, 
e.g., Christmas, 465 A.2d at 991; see also Devine, supra note 10, at 16. For example, Richard 
A. Devine, a Cook County state's attorney, wrote a commentary in the Chicago Trillune de-
crying the suppression of a nine year old's incriminating statement to the police. See 
Devine, supra note 10, at 16. The judge believed that the child did not understand his 
Miranda warning. See id. Devine, however, emphasized the impact of a juvenile's crime on 
the community, as well as the repercussions of the crime for the juvenile himself. See id. He 
wrote: 
ld. 
[t]herefore the question of whether to 'throw out' a juvenile's confession is 
more complex than merely looking at the juvenile'S age. If a juvenile under 
10 is involved in a murder, or any serious crime, something has gone terribly 
wrong in that young person's life even before the crime was committed .... I 
recognize that views diverge on whether it is ever possible for a juvenile to 
waive his or her rights under such circumstances. But, under Illinois law, if we 
are to address the underlying problems that cause ajuvenile to commit such a 
crime, we have no alternative but to proceed in a juvenile system that has be-
come increasingly adversarial in nature, not always to the benefit of ... the 
accused. 
243 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442,476-77. 
244 See id. at 442. 
245 See id. at 476-77. 
246 See id. at 468-69, 471-72. 
247 See id. at 460, 467-68. 
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When juveniles are involved, it is important to additionally factor 
in the previous discussion that juveniles do not fully understand what 
it means to have a constitutional right because of their psychological 
and cognitive development.248 To uphold Miranda's intent that indi-
viduals must understand their rights, then, it is necessary to go be-
yond the per se warning required for adults when a juvenile is under 
interrogation.249 Thus, the implementation of a per se rule that re-
quires the presence of an adult during interrogation for juveniles six-
teen and under is not a technicality, but the means of ensuring that 
juveniles understand and apply a fundamental constitutional right. 25o 
Any logistical or economic burden that such a rule imposes upon the 
juvenile justice system is a necessary one in light of its essential pro-
tective function. 251 
B. Child-Proof Language 
In addition to the per se rule, another interrogation safeguard 
that should be implemented by police officers during interrogations 
is the use of simple language that is more comprehensible to juve-
niles.252 Evidence suggests that Miranda rights should be modified 
when administered to juveniles to make them more comprehensi-
ble.253 In 1985, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire heeded this 
advice in State v. Benoit by suggesting that a juvenile needs to be in-
formed of his constitutional rights in a language understandable to a 
child.254 The court suggested that a child should be told "You have the 
right to remain silent. This means that you do not have to say or write 
anything. You do not have to talk to anyone or answer any questions 
we ask you. You will not be punished for deciding not to talk to us. "255 
A simplified warning, of course, does not "diminish the potentially 
intimidating nature of a police interrogation .... "256 This is why clear, 
understandable warnings must be used in conjunction with other 
248 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35; Grisso, supra note 60, at 30. 
249 See 384 U.S. at 444-45. 
250 See, e.g., In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1312. 
251 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481. 
252 See State v. Benoit 490 A.2d 295, 300, 304 (N.H. 1985); Chao, supra note 1, at 547. 
253 See Chao, supra note 1, at 526; Grisso, supra note 96, at 1161. 
254 See 490 A.2d at 304. 
255 Id. at 30&-07. 
256 See Grisso, supra note 96, at 1162. 
384 Boston College Third World Law j()Urnal [Vol. 22:355 
safeguards, such as the required presence of an interested adult, to 
ensure that ajuvenile fully understands his rights.257 
Similarly, state legislatures need to mandate that state and local 
police departments research and develop an interview technique that 
is more reflective of a juvenile's psychological development, and then 
train personnel in the implementation of these techniques.258 Al-
though some states do have legislation regarding police training pro-
grams on the handling of juvenile matters, the legislation does not 
specifically address the issue of juvenile interrogation.259 For example, 
a Connecticut statute provides that "[e) ach police basic training pro-
gram conducted or administered by the Division of State Police within 
the Department of Public Safety shall provide a minimum of twenty-
seven hours of training relative to the handling of juvenile matters. "260 
This statute, however, only makes the general requirement that part 
of this training must be related to "information relative to the process-
ing and disposition of juvenile matters. "261 Likewise, Florida created a 
Juvenile Justice Standards and Training Commission "to enable the 
state to provide a systematic approach to staff development and train-
ing for judges, state attorneys, public defenders, [and] law enforce-
ment officers" but, again, it never specifically mandates training pro-
cedures related to juvenile interrogation.262 
Individuals working with juveniles in interrogations may find it 
useful to examine, for instance, the various protocols for proper ques-
tioning of children currently used in suspected child abuse situa-
tions.263 These protocols generally mandate that a mental health pro-
fessional be present during questioning and prohibit the use of 
leading or suggestive questions.264 They were developed in large part 
in the wake of several high-profile child abuse cases, such as the Cali-
fornia McMartin preschool case, in which children made false accusa-
tions of sexual abuse.265 It seems that the abundance of high-profile 
false confessions resulting from juvenile interrogations would warrant 
a similar solution.266 
257 See id. 
258 See Beyer, supra note 37, at 35. 
259 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-294h (West 2000). 
260 See§ 7-294h. 
261 See id. 
262 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.406 (West 2000). 
263 See Bach, supra note 9. 
264 See id. 
265 See id. 
266 See id. 
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Again, a look at In re B.M.B. illustrates the need for this proto-
co1.267 There, the Supreme Court of Kansas explicitly agreed that the 
taped transcript showed that the detective "[misled] B.M.B. into 
thinking that the situation was not serious by failing to tell [him] he 
was under arrest and facing a very serious charge and by acting as if 
he were a pal rather than a law enforcement officer. "268 After B.M.B. 
denies several times that he touched the girl, the detective clearly 
leads the boy, asking, "You didn't mean to hurt her, did you? ... I 
mean was it an accident?"269 When the juvenile starts to reply "I don't 
see how I could have touched though cause all I was doing was put-
ting sand on her ... ," the detective interrupts him to say, "but your 
hand touched her down there, didn't it? You know, it's okay .... [i]f 
you talk to me and let me know we can help. "270 
At a hearing on the motion for a new trial, a psychiatrist testified 
that, "I have to say, unfortunately, [that this interview is] probably the 
worst I have seen in my career. "271 In reference to the use of suggestive 
and leading questions and comments, he said: 
[t]hese are techniques that law enforcement people, to my 
knowledge, are trained to use with adult suspects .... They 
are wholly inappropriate for use with ten-year-old children . 
. . . Even in settings where less pressure, less suggestion and 
less coercion has been studied, we found substantial num-
bers of children will agree with things that are factually inac-
curate ... perhaps as many as half of all children interviewed 
in this way would have given some minimal agreement to 
what was being suggested to them .... "272 
The Supreme Court of Kansas pointed out a further problem, explic-
itly mentioning that the detective and juvenile did not "shar[e] a vo-
cabulary for the subject. [In fact] the transcript leaves the reader 
wondering if the two are talking about the same thing .... "273 
Juvenile advocates warn that "it is imperative that everyone in-
volved in the [juvenile] justice system reconsider the important role 
immaturity plays in a juvenile'S commission of a crime and compe-
267 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1308. 
268 See id. 
269 See id. at 1309. 
270 See id. at 1305. 
271 See id. at 1305-06. 
272 See In re B.M.B., 955 P.2d at 1309. 
273Id. 
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tency to aid in his or her own defense. "274 This may require, for in-
stance, evaluators "who are skilled at a culturally sensitive assessment 
of adolescent development .... "275 In terms of interrogation, this 
means that law enforcement officials need to use words that are not 
confusing to children when giving them a Miranda warning, as well as 
when questioning them.276 Law enforcement officers need to stop us-
ing leading questions filled with suggestive words that serve to ma-
nipulate a juvenile.277 They must not be allowed to suggest intent, as 
was the case with thirteen-year-old Latasha.278 Instead, police officers 
need to let a juvenile show, by answering with his own words, whether 
he "agreed" or "acquiesced. "279 
CONCLUSION 
In June 2000, an Ohio appeals court threw out a fourteen year 
old's murder conviction because it believed the boy had been coerced 
into confessing.28o The court reasoned that the line of questioning the 
juvenile was subjected to would "lead any twelve-year-old to believe 
'that he had no choice but to submit and confess."281 In April 1999, a 
Texas appeals court threw out the juvenile conviction and twenty-five-
year sentence of Lacresha Murray. who was eleven years old when she 
confessed to the murder of a young toddler.282 An editorial in the 
Washington Post said that after reading the transcript of Lacresha's in-
terrogation, it was "hard to escape the conclusion that investigators 
were playing a sort of hardball to which no child should be subjected 
if the goal is to get the truth from her. "283 
274 Beyer, supra note 37, at 35. 
275Id. 
276 See id.; Young, supra note 8. 
277 See Young, supra note 8. 
278 See id.; discussion supra Part I. 
279 See id. 
280 See Teen Freed, supra note 239. 
281 Ill. 
282 See Interrogating Children, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1999, at A22. Although the convic-
tion was based on the court's view that Lacresha had not been properly apprised of her 
rights, the transcript of her interrogation suggests elements of coercion. See id. For exam-
ple, according to a May 1999 article in the St. Peterslmrg Times, Lacresha's "taped confession 
indicates that she told police almost 40 times that she did not hurt [the toddler]." Blum-
ner, supra note 8. Eventually, she agreed that she may have dropped the toddler, and with 
more coaching from the detectives who knew that the toddler's injuries could not be fully 
explained by being dropped, she told them she may have accidentally kicked her, too. See 
id. "Police then wrote out a confession, and LaCresha [sic] signed." Id. 
283 Interrogating Children, supra note 282. 
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Cases similar to that of A.M. or Latasha or Lacresha will keep re-
curring unless steps are taken to prevent law enforcement officials 
and prosecutors from exploiting the inherent naivete and immaturity 
of juveniles.284 Instead, states must require them to take into consid-
eration the nuances of adolescent psychological development. In 
terms of procedural protections, this means implementing per se 
rules and undertaking interviews with language that is comprehensi-
ble to juveniles. Only then will a juvenile's Fifth Amendment right be 
protected. 
284 See Ken Armstrong et aI., cops and Confessions, CHI. 'fluB., Dec. 18,2001, at 1. A Chi-
cago 1Tibune article reported that "since 1991, police from Cook County law enforcement 
agencies have obtained at least 71 murder confessions from suspects age 16 and under that 
were so unconvincing or improper that the courts threw them out, prosecutors dropped 
the charges or the juveniles were acquitted at trial." See id. The 1Tibune article appeared 
just as this Note was going to press, and thus it is not incorporated in the discussion. How-
ever, the lengthy article references many of the same issues as this Note, and it is a very 
thorough and informative investigation of how juvenile confessions are often mishandled 
in Chicago and surrounding areas. See id. 

